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a b s t r a c t
The mixed-strategy equilibrium of the production-in-advance type capacity-constrained Bertrand–
Edgeworth duopoly game has not been derived analytically for the case of intermediate capacities
in the literature. As in the case of the production-to-order version of the same game, the case of
intermediate capacities turned out to be the most difficult one compared with the cases of small and
large capacities. In this paper we derive analytically a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the
production-in-advance version of this game for a large region of intermediate capacities. Nevertheless
we show that in general the economic surplus within the production-to-order type environment is
higher than in the respective production-in-advance type one, and, therefore, production-to-order
should be preferred to production-in-advance if the mode of production can be influenced by the
government.
© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
In one of the basic oligopoly games firms can set prices and
quantities at the same time in a homogeneous good market.
This framework was already introduced by Shubik (1955) and
referred to by Maskin (1986) as the production-in-advance en-
vironment in which production takes place before sales are re-
alized. Markets of perishable goods are usually mentioned as
examples of advance production in a market. In contrast, in case
of production-to-order, production takes place after prices are
known.
Shubik (1955) indicated that the production-in-advance game
might not have an equilibrium in pure strategies.1 Maskin (1986)
established the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for
the production-in-advance game under quite general conditions.
Assuming unlimited capacities and linear demand, Levitan and
Shubik (1978) computed the mixed-strategy equilibrium for the
case of production in advance. In the same framework Gertner
(1986) determined the mixed-strategy equilibrium under more
general conditions. While comparing the production-in-advance
equilibrium profits with that under production-to-order, Tasnádi
(2004, Section 4) and Tasnádi (2019) determined the equilibrium
profits of the production-in-advance game. Recently, Montez and
E-mail address: attila.tasnadi@uni-corvinus.hu.
URL: https://web.uni-corvinus.hu/~tasnadi.
1 Friedman (1988) established the non-existence of a pure-strategy equilib-
rium in case of differentiated goods, which does not include the homogeneous
good case investigated in this paper.
Schutz (2018), as a part of a larger project on unsold invento-
ries and exploring relations with other micro-theoretic models,
determined the mixed-strategy equilibrium of the production-in-
advance game for the case of unlimited capacities (or equivalently
for the case of large capacities) and pointed out shortcomings of
the previous solutions.2
In Tasnádi (2004) we showed that within the framework
of a capacity-constrained Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly the
production-in-advance and the production-to-order environments
result in the same profits. In obtaining this result we considered
the small capacity, the intermediate capacity and the large ca-
pacity cases. Since the small capacity case has a simple solution
in pure strategies (e.g. Tasnádi, 2004, Section 3) and the large
capacity case has been solved completely by Montez and Schutz
(2018), in this paper we focus on the most challenging case of
intermediate capacities3 for which we determine a symmetric
mixed-strategy equilibrium on a large subregion. The latter case
was only partially solved over the entire region of intermediate
capacities in Tasnádi (2004, Section 5), which focused on the
2 For recent theoretical results on the production-in-advance game we refer
the reader to Bos and Vermeulen (2015) and van den Berg and Bos (2017). For
related recent experimental results see Casaburi and Minerva (2011) and Davis
(2013).
3 The same three cases emerge in the production-to-order environment in
which the cases of small and large capacities are simple, whereas the case
of intermediate capacities is challenging (e.g. Osborne and Pitchik, 1986). In
the production-in-advance environment the case of large capacities is far more
complex than the case of small capacities; however, the case of intermediate
capacities still appears to be the hardest.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2020.03.002
0165-4896/© 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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determination of the equilibrium profits. Calculating the bottom
‘half’ of the symmetric equilibrium price distribution for the case
of intermediate capacities was already sufficient for the determi-
nation of the equilibrium profits. After one and a half decades the
Montez and Schutz (2018) paper served as an inspiration to deter-
mine the top ‘half’ with respect to prices of the symmetric-mixed
strategy equilibrium. The difficulty in calculating the mixed-
strategy equilibrium was to realize that there is an area of best
responses to the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium strategy
of the other firm in the price-quantity space. Nevertheless, the
support of the mixed-strategy equilibrium remains still one-
dimensional, that is there is a two-dimensional set of indifferent
pure strategies never played in a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In
addition, we can show in general that the economic surplus is
greater in the case where firms produce to order than when they
produce in advance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 presents the framework, Section 3 determines a sym-
metric mixed-strategy equilibrium on a large subregion of inter-
mediate capacities, Section 4 investigates economic surplus, and
Section 5 concludes.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the necessary assumptions, nota-
tions and already available results.
Assumption 1. The demand curve D : R+ → R+ is strictly
decreasing on [0, b], identically zero on [b, ∞), continuous at b
and twice continuously differentiable on (0, b). Furthermore, the
revenue function pD(p) is strictly concave on [0, b].
We shall denote by a the horizontal intercept of D; i.e. D (0)
= a. In addition, we shall denote by P the inverse demand
function.
In our model two firms set their prices and quantities simul-
taneously.
Assumption 2. Firms 1 and 2 have identical positive unit costs
c ∈ (0, b) up to the same positive capacity constraint k. Each
of them sets its price (p1, p2 ∈ [0, b]) and production quantity
(q1, q2 ∈ [0, k]).
Throughout the paper i and j will be used to refer to the two
firms; in particular, i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i ̸= j.
We employ the efficient rationing by the low-price firm, which
occurs in a market if the consumers can costlessly resell the
good to each other or if the consumers have heterogeneous unit
demands and the consumers having higher reservation prices
are served first (for more details we refer to Vives, 1999 and
Wolfstetter, 1999), to determine the demand faced by the firms.
Assumption 3. The demand faced by firm i is given by
∆i (p1, q1, p2, q2) =
⎧⎨⎩
D (pi) if pi < pj
qi
qi+qj
D (pi) if pi = pj(
D (pi) − qj
)+ if pi > pj.
Under Assumption 3 the low-price firm faces the entire de-
mand, firms with identical prices split the demand in proportion
to the firms’ quantity decisions4 and the high-price firm faces a
4 The essential property of the tie-breaking rule employed in this paper is
that firm i’s demand is strictly increasing in firm i’s own quantity (see also
Maskin, 1986). In fact, any other tie-breaking rule satisfying the latter property
does the job. Nevertheless, the tie-breaking rule specified in Assumption 3
reflects a larger visibility by consumers and a lower risk of being out-of-stock
in case of a larger production.
so-called residual demand, which equals the demand minus the
quantity produced by the low-price firm.
We define the firms’ profit functions as follows:
πi ((p1, q1) , (p2, q2)) = pi min {∆i (p1, q1, p2, q2) , qi} − cqi
for both i ∈ {1, 2}.
Maskin (1986, Theorem 1) demonstrated that the production-
in-advance game possesses an equilibrium in mixed strategies. In
the following, a mixed strategy is a probability measure defined
on the σ -algebra of Borel measurable sets on [0, b]×[0, k], which
can be restricted without loss of generality to S = [c, b] × [0, k].
In equilibrium, each firm optimally chooses µi conditional on µj,
i ̸= j. Such an equilibrium is denoted by (µ∗1, µ
∗
2). A mixed-
strategy equilibrium
(
µ∗1, µ
∗
2
)
can be calculated by the following
two conditions:
π1
(
(p1, q1) , µ∗2
)
⩽ π∗1 , π2
(
µ∗1, (p2, q2)
)
⩽ π∗2 (1)
hold true for all (p1, q1) , (p2, q2) ∈ S, and
π1
((
p∗1, q
∗
1
)
, µ∗2
)
= π∗1 , π2
(
µ∗1,
(
p∗2, q
∗
2
))
= π∗2 (2)
holds true µ∗1-almost everywhere and µ
∗
2-almost everywhere,
where π∗1 , π
∗
2 stand for the equilibrium profits corresponding
to
(
µ∗1, µ
∗
2
)
.5 In addition, it can be verified that a symmetric
equilibrium in mixed strategies exists by applying Theorem 6∗ of
Dasgupta and Maskin (1986).
Three special prices play an important role in the analysis. We
define p∗ to be the price that clears the firms’ aggregate capacity
from the market if such a price exists, and zero otherwise. That
is,
p∗ =
{
D−1 (2k) if D (0) > 2k
0 if D (0) ⩽ 2k.
The function
π r (p) = (p − c) (D (p) − k)
equals a firm’s residual profit whenever its opponent sells k and
D (p) ⩾ k. Let p = argmaxp∈[c,b] π r (p) and π = π r (p). Clearly,
p∗ and p are well defined whenever Assumptions 1 and 2 are
satisfied. Finally, let p = c + π/k, that is p is the price at
which a firm is indifferent between selling its entire capacity and
maximizing profits on the residual demand curve.
For the case of small capacities, i.e. p∗ ⩾ p, the game has a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies in which the firms produce
at their capacity limits and set the market-clearing price (e.g. Tas-
nádi, 2004, Proposition 2). The mixed-strategy equilibrium for
the case of large capacities, i.e. D(c) ⩽ k, has been determined
recently by Montez and Schutz (2018) in which the firms charge
prices above their common unit costs. Therefore, in this paper
we focus on the open and most challenging case of intermediate
capacities, i.e. p > max {p∗, c}, which was also the most difficult
one in the production-to-order environment. We had established
the following proposition earlier.
Proposition 1 (Tasnádi, 2004, Proposition 4). Let Assumptions 1–
3 hold. If p > max {p∗, c}, then in a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium (µ∗, µ∗) of the production-in-advance game we have
µ∗
([
p, p
]
× [0, k]
)
= µ∗
([
p, p
]
× {k}
)
=
(p − c) k − π
p (2k − D (p))
(3)
for any p ∈
[
p, p
)
.
5 Conditions (1) and (2) are equivalent with the definition
of an equilibrium in mixed strategies as stated, for instance, in
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 34) as a generalization of their
Lemma 33.2.
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In the original statement of Proposition 4 in Tasnádi (2004)
even the concavity of the demand curve was assumed. However,
the concavity of the demand curve was imposed to exclude holes
in the equilibrium distribution of prices and the proofs remain
valid under weaker conditions. In particular, the last step at the
end of the proof of Lemma 2 in Tasnádi (2004, 2019) holds also
if a log-concave demand curve is assumed, while the last step at
the end of the proof of Lemma 4 in Tasnádi (2004) works under
the assumption of a concave revenue function pD(p). These were
the only two points where the concavity of the demand function
was employed in the proofs leading to Proposition 4 in Tasnádi
(2004).
Osborne and Pitchik (1986) showed already for the production-
to-order environment that the assumption of a concave rev-
enue function is indispensable to avoid holes in the support of
the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Their solution is on [p, p) very
similar to the equilibrium cumulative distribution of prices in
Proposition 1.6 Since finding the mixed-strategy equilibrium for
the production-in-advance environment is much harder than
for the respective production-to-order environment we avoid
the complication related to handling possible price gaps in the
equilibrium price distribution, and therefore we impose the as-
sumption of a strictly concave revenue function pD(p).
3. Mixed-strategy equilibrium
We build on Proposition 1 in that we try to extend the par-
tially revealed symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. The main
idea while finding the mixed-strategy equilibrium is to consider
strategies which have in the best response correspondence an
interval of quantities on an interval of prices starting at p. How-
ever, in equilibrium they are just choosing one quantity from the
interval of indifferent quantities resulting in the same equilibrium
profit level.7
Before proceeding, we need to introduce several further no-
tations. Let F (p) = µ∗
([
p, p
]
× [0, k]
)
denote the cumulative
distribution of equilibrium prices. From Proposition 1 we already
know that s(p) = k for all p ∈
[
p, p
)
and that F is atomless on
p ∈
[
p, p
)
. We shall denote by
p̂ = inf {p ∈ [c, b] | µ ((p, b] × [0, k]) = 0}
the highest possible price set by a firm when playing an arbi-
trary strategy µ. We expect to find a symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium in which at prices p ∈ [c, p̂] ⊂ [c, b] at most one
quantity s(p) ∈ [0, k] will be produced in equilibrium. Therefore,
a mixed-strategy equilibrium can be given by the triple (̂p, s, F ).
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1–3 hold. If p > max {p∗, c}, then
a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium (µ∗, µ∗) of the production-
in-advance game is given by the following equilibrium price distri-
bution8
F (p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ⩽ p < p,
(p−c)k−π
p(2k−D(p)) if p ⩽ p < p,
1 − cp if p ⩽ p < p̂, and
1 if p̂ ⩽ p ⩽ b
(4)
6 In both the production-to-order and production-in-advance environments
the firms produce at their capacity limits and there is just a slight difference in
the shapes of the respective equilibrium price distributions.
7 On the interval on which Proposition 1 did not determine the equilibrium
price distribution, the truncated Pareto distribution emerges as in other models
with a lot of indifferent best responses (e.g. Ravid et al., 2019).
8 We conjecture that the derived mixed-strategy equilibrium is ‘essentially’
unique within the class of symmetric mixed-strategy equilibria. Clearly, it cannot
be unique since the values of s can be altered on an F-null set. Showing that
the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium is essentially unique, appears to be
a very difficult task.
and by the ‘supply’ function s(p) given by s(p) = k for all p ∈
[
p, p
)
and determined by
s(p) = D′(p)
(
p2
c
− p
)
+ D(p) +
π
c
(5)
for all p ∈ [p, p̂] if
p̂ ⩽ P(k), (6)
where p̂ is the unique solution of s(r) = D(r)/2.
Proof. The proof also includes how the symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium was derived and not just the mere verification of the
statement.9
We search for a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in a
special form by assuming that at prices p ∈ [c, p̂] ⊂ [c, b] at
most one quantity s(p) ∈ [0, k] will be produced in equilibrium. In
addition, we assume that s is strictly decreasing and continuously
differentiable on [p, p̂). Furthermore, we assume that F is even
atomless on [ p, p̂). From Proposition 1 we already know that
s(p) = k for all p ∈
[
p, p
)
and that F is atomless on p ∈[
p, p
)
. Some additional technical assumptions will be imposed
during the process of determining the symmetric mixed-strategy
equilibrium.
Assume that (̂p, s, F ) is associated with a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium (µ, µ). Since s and F are known for all p ∈[
p, p
)
in what follows we consider without loss of generality only
prices such that p ⩾ p. Furthermore, let f (p) = F ′(p), where F is
differentiable. We shall denote by r∗ ∈ [p, p̂] the price at which
s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2 and assume that such a price exists uniquely.10
Furthermore, to arrive to the equilibrium given in the statement
of Proposition 2 the inequality r∗ ⩽ P(k) (i.e. condition (6)) will
be crucial.
Firm 1’s profit equals
π1 ((p, q), µ) = pq (1 − F (p))
+ p
∫ p
p
min
{
(D(p) − s(r))+, q
}
dF (r) +
p
∫ p
p
min
{
(D(p) − k)+, q
}
dF (r) − cq (7)
for any p ∈ (p, p̂) and any q ∈ [0,min{k,D(p)}], where we
have already taken into account that D(p) < s(p) = q does not
make sense since then the firms produce a superfluous amount
for sure. Note that we cannot have q = s(p) < (D(p) − k)+
since this would result in even less profits than choosing pure-
strategy (p,D (p)). Hence, in what follows we can assume that
q ⩾ (D(p) − k)+. Therefore, (7) simplifies to
π1 ((p, q), µ) = pq (1 − F (p)) + p
∫ p
p
min {D(p) − s(r), q} dF (r) +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − k)dF (r) − cq, (8)
where we can drop the positive part symbol in the first integral
of (7) because we will speak only about a solution if finally (6)
holds.
In determining ∂π1
∂q ((p, q), µ) first let us consider the case in
which D(p) − s(p) < q, and therefore D(p) − s(r) < q for all
9 The verification of the equilibrium properties would not lead to a signifi-
cantly shorter proof; however, we would loose the insightful steps to arrive to
the equilibrium.
10 After deriving (19), we will verify in the proof that the s given by (5)
is continuous and strictly decreasing on p ∈ [p, p̂] and that r∗ is uniquely
determined by the properties of D and this s.
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r ∈ [p, p] since s is (assumed to be) strictly decreasing. Then it
follows that
∂π1
∂q
((p, q), µ) = p (1 − F (p)) − c. (9)
Second, we consider the case in which D(p) − s(p) > q. Since
D(p) − s(p) > q ⩾ D(p) − k = D(p) − s(p) and s is continuous
and strictly decreasing on
[
p, p̂
]
there exists a unique r ∈
[
p, p
)
such that D(p) − s(r) = q. Then r = s−1 (D(p) − q). We denote
the functional relationship between q and r by r(q). Clearly, r(q)
is strictly increasing. Now (8) can be written as
π1 ((p, q), µ) = pq (1 − F (p)) + p
∫ p
r(q)
qdF (r) +
p
∫ r(q)
p
D(p) − s(r)dF (r) +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − k)dF (r) − cq, (10)
from which we get
∂π1
∂q
((p, q), µ) = p (1 − F (p)) + p
∫ p
r(q)
dF (r) − pqf (r(q))r ′(q) +
p (D(p) − s(r(q))) f (r(q))r ′(q) − c
= p (1 − F (p)) + p
∫ p
r(q)
dF (r) − pqf (r(q))r ′(q) +
pqf (r(q))r ′(q) − c
= p (1 − F (r(q))) − c. (11)
Summarizing (9) and (11), we get
∂π1
∂q
((p, q), µ)
=
{
p (1 − F (p)) − c if D(p) − s(p) < q,
p (1 − F (r(q))) − c if D(p) − s(p) > q ⩾ D(p) − k.
(12)
It can be verified that p (1 − F (p)) − c = 0 and
p
(
1 −
(p − c) k − π
p (2k − D (p))
)
− c > 0 (13)
for all p ∈
[
p, b
]
\ {p}. Since F does not have an atom at price p
we have
π1 ((p, q), µ) = π
for all q ∈ [D(p) − k, k].
Assume that we have p (1 − F (p)) − c = 0 for all p ∈ [p, r∗)
resulting for any q ∈ [D(p) − s(p), k] in the same profits by (12).
Then
F (p) = 1 −
c
p
(14)
for all p ∈ [p, r∗), and therefore the firms never produce less than
D(p)− s(p) for any p ∈
[
p, r∗
)
by p (1 − F (r(q)))− c > 0 and (12).
Now from (8) and (14) we can derive s on the respective interval
by solving
π = π1 ((p, q), µ) = pq
c
p
+ p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − s(r))
c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − k) f (r)dr − cq (15)
= pD(p)
(
1 −
c
p
)
− pk
(
1 −
c
p
)
−p
∫ p
p
s(r)
c
r2
dr,
where we have taken into account (12) together with our obser-
vations from this paragraph. Let
S(p) =
∫ p
p
s(r)
c
r2
dr (16)
for any p ∈ [p, r∗). Then we have
S(p) = 0 and S ′(p) = s(p)
c
p2
(17)
for any p ∈ [p, r∗). From (15) we get
S(p) =
pD(p)
(
1 − cp
)
− pk
(
1 − cp
)
− π
p
(18)
for any p ∈ [p, r∗) from which by differentiation we obtain S ′ and
finally by simple rearrangements we get (5). By differentiation
and rearrangements we get
s′(p) = D′′(p)p
(p
c
− 1
)
+ D′(p)
2p
c
(19)
from which by Assumption 1 it follows that s′(p) is negative, and
thus s is indeed strictly decreasing. It can be verified that s(p) is
continuous at p by evaluating the expression in (5) at p.
We verify that s′(p) < D′(p) holds for prices higher than p by
the following series of inequalities and a final rearrangement:
0 >
[
D′′(p)p + 2D′(p)
] (p
c
− 1
)
= D′′(p)p
(p
c
− 1
)
+D′(p)
(
2p
c
− 2
)
> D′′(p)p
(p
c
− 1
)
+ D′(p)
(
2p
c
− 1
)
⇒
D′(p) > D′′(p)p
(p
c
− 1
)
+ D′(p)
2p
c
= s′(p),
where first, we employed Assumption 1, p > c , and finally (19).
Taking D(p)/2 < s(p) into account the desired uniqueness of r∗
follows.
Clearly, both S and s can be extended through Eqs. (16) and
(17) for prices higher than r∗, respectively, where for p ⩾ r∗
Eq. (15) takes the following form
π = π1 ((p, q), µ) = pq
c
p
+ p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr
+p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p) − s(r))
c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − k) f (r)dr − cq
= pD(p)
(
1 −
c
r∗
)
− pk
(
1 −
c
p
)
−
p
∫ r∗
p
s(r)
c
r2
dr + p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr. (20)
For any p ⩾ r∗ let
Q (p) =
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr. (21)
Then we have
Q (r∗) = 0 and Q ′(p) = s(p)
c
p2
(22)
for any p ∈
[
r∗, r ′
)
, where r ′ is uniquely defined by the im-
plicit equation s(r ′) = D(r ′) − k. Clearly, setting prices above r ′
does no make sense, since playing these pure strategies against
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mixed-strategy µs,F will result in less profits than pure-strategy
(p,D(p) − k). From (20) we get
Q (p) =
pD(p)
(
1 − cr∗
)
− pk
(
1 − cp
)
− pS(r∗) − π
p
(23)
for any p ∈
[
r∗, r ′,
)
from which by differentiation we obtain Q ′
and finally by simple rearrangements s(p). With a slight abuse
of notation we will still denote the obtained function by s(p) on
p ∈
(
r∗, r ′
)
though, as it will turn out, the firms will not produce
at prices above r∗. These extensions will be helpful for us in the
price interval [r∗, r ′].
Now we will verify that having an atom at price r∗ of mass
c/r∗ = 1 − F (r∗) completes a symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium. We shall denote the price distribution that has just
been completely specified by F . Assume that firm 2 plays the
same mixed strategy. Then we already know that for any p ∈[
p, r∗
)
producing an amount of q = s(p) results in π profit by
Proposition 1 and the definition of s on p ∈ [p, r∗) by (17).
Furthermore, for any p ∈
[
p, p
)
producing less than k results
in less profits then π , and for any p ∈ [p, r∗) and any quantity
[D(p) − s(p), k] profits equal π , while they are strictly less for
quantities less than D(p) − s(p) by (12).
We claim that in the derived symmetric mixed-strategy equi-
librium firms produce at price r∗ an amount of s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2.
Suppose that they would produce more than D(r∗)/2. Then there
will be superfluous production at price r∗, and therefore by
the continuity of profits for prices below r∗ profits at price r∗
would be less then at prices r∗ − ε if ε is sufficiently small.
Suppose that they would produce an amount of q∗ less than
D(r∗)/2. Then π1
(
(p, q), µs,F
)
is continuous at (q∗, r∗), and there-
fore π1
(
(r∗, q∗), µs,F
)
< π ; a contradiction. Thus, we must have
indeed s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2. By the left continuity at price r∗ it follows
that π1
(
(r∗,D(r∗)/2), µs,F
)
= π .
To verify that the triple (̂p, s, F ) specified in the previous
paragraphs specifies a strategy of a symmetric mixed-equilibrium
it remains to be shown that prices above r∗ combined with any
quantity q ∈ [0, k] result in less profits than π .
The profit function of firm 1 in response to firm 2 playing the
mixed strategy associated with (̂p, s, F ) for prices p ⩾ r∗ equals
π1
(
(p, q), µs,F
)
= pmin
{
D(p) −
D(r∗)
2
, q
}
c
r∗
+p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p) − s(r))
c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − k) f (r)dr − cq (24)
from which we get11
∂π1
∂q
((p, q), µ) =
{
−c if D(p) − D(r
∗)
2 < q,
p cr∗ − c if D(p) −
D(r∗)
2 > q ⩾ D(p) − k
(25)
for any p > p̂ = r∗. Since pc/r∗ − c > 0 we get that quantity
q = D(p) − D(r
∗)
2 results in the highest profit in (24) for any price
p > p̂ = r∗.
11 Note that (12) is only valid for (p, q) ∈ (p, p̂) × [0, k], while here we need
the first order condition for p > p̂.
Hence, we define the profit function of firm 1 at the best
quantities for prices p ⩾ r∗ by
π∗(p) = p
(
D(p) −
D(r∗)
2
)
c
r∗
+ p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p) − s(r))
c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − k) f (r)dr − c
(
D(p) −
D(r∗)
2
)
(26)
It can be verified that π∗(p) is strictly concave, and it would be
straightforward to check that the derivative π∗(p) is non-positive
at r∗, which unfortunately does not result in a manageable in-
equality. Therefore, we consider the equality in (20) defining s
and let us denote by
π s(p) = p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr + p
∫ r∗
p
(D(p) − s(r))
c
r2
dr +
p
∫ p
p
(D(p) − k) f (r)dr = π (27)
for prices p ∈
[
r∗, r ′
]
. Clearly, dπ s(p)/dp = 0 for any p ∈
[
r∗, r ′
]
by the definition of s, which we will utilize by considering ∆(p) =
π∗(p) − π s(p) = p
(
D(p) −
D(r∗)
2
)
c
r∗
− c
(
D(p) −
D(r∗)
2
)
−p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr
=
(
D(p) −
D(r∗)
2
)(
p
c
r∗
− c
)
−p
∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr. (28)
Then
∆′(p) = D′(p)
(
p
c
r∗
− c
)
+
(
D(p) −
D(r∗)
2
)
c
r∗
−∫ p
r∗
s(r)
c
r2
dr − ps(p)
c
p2
. (29)
By substituting r∗ for p in (29) and taking s(r∗) = D(r∗)/2 into
consideration we get ∆′(r∗) = 0, which implies dπ∗(p)/dp = 0,
which completes the proof. □
The functional form of the equilibrium price distribution in
Montez and Schutz (2019, Lemma IV) is identical with the equi-
librium price distribution given in (4) on the interval [p, p̂). How-
ever, besides the respective intervals the associated production
levels are significantly different. In their equilibrium each firm
produces the market demand D(p) at price p, while in the equilib-
rium we have obtained each firm produces less than its capacity
k (which is even less than D(p)).
The region of intermediate capacities not covered by
Proposition 2 appears to be far more complex. We conjecture that
the price distribution F specified in Proposition 2 remains still the
equilibrium price distribution in the ‘high range’ of intermediate
capacities. Furthermore, the expression on the right-hand side of
(5) still specifies s(p) on the interval [p, P(k)] since in this case in
the proof of Proposition 2 in Eq. (7) D(p) − s(r) is non-negative
for any p ∈ [p, P(k)] and any r ∈ [p, p]. We expect that s can be
defined recursively and will be piecewise strictly decreasing and
twice continuously differentiable on
[
p, p̂
]
.
Providing more details about the idea, let s1 be the expression
on the right-hand side of (5). For notational convenience let p1 =
P(k) and s0(p) = k for any p ∈
[
p, p̂
]
. When extending function
s to prices above p one needs to integrate in (7) D(p) − s1(r)
only above prices r on which the integrand is non-negative.
To determine the lowest price from which the integration of
16 A. Tasnádi / Mathematical Social Sciences 106 (2020) 11–18
Fig. 1. Four different cases.
D(p)−s1(r) should start for a given p defining t1(p) = s−11 (D(p)) =
r would be useful. The strategy for constructing the mixed-
strategy equilibrium would be to determine the next piece of s
denoted by s2. Then arriving either to r∗ the top of the support
of solution of F satisfying s2(r∗) = D(r∗)/2 and r∗ ⩽ p2 =
s2(p1) or repeating the same process to obtain the next piece of s
denoted by s3. The process should be repeated until an r∗ obtains
satisfying sn(r∗) = D(r∗)/2 and r∗ ⩽ pn = sn(pn−1).
For the demand curve D(p) = 1 − p Fig. 1 shows the four
different cases we can have. On the horizontal axis we have k,
while on the vertical axis we have c. The darkest shaded triangle
depicts the case of large capacities (c ⩾ 1 − k), the triangle on
the bottom (c ⩽ 1 − 3k) depicts the case of small capacities,
the shaded area in the middle (s(1 − k) ⩽ k/2) depicts the
case of intermediate capacities covered by Proposition 2, and the
white area depicts the case for which we have not determined an
equilibrium in mixed strategies.
To illustrate Proposition 2 we provide an example.
Example 1. Let D(p) = 1 − p, k = 0.4 and c = 0.1.
Then one can obtain that the price maximizing the residual
profit function equals p = 0.35 and results in π = 0.0625 profit.
The price at which a firm is indifferent between maximizing prof-
its on the residual demand curve and selling its entire capacity
equals p = 0.25625. By (4) a firm never sets prices below p and
produces at its capacity limit k = 0.4 when setting prices in[
p, p
]
= [0.25625, 0.35]. Furthermore, by (4) in equilibrium at
prices above p = 0.35 firms produce
s(p) = 1.625 − 10p2
for all p ∈ [p, p̂], where p̂ is obtained as the solution of equation
s(p) = (1− p)/2, and in particular, we get p̂ = 0.3613406011768
4275. The cumulative distribution function of prices set by a firm
in equilibrium is given by
F (p) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ⩽ p < p,
0.4p−0.12
(p−0.2)p if p ⩽ p < p,
1 − 0.1p if p ⩽ p < p̂, and
1 if p̂ ⩽ p ⩽ 1.
It is worthwhile mentioning that only the highest possible price
p̂ is chosen with positive probability in equilibrium, in particular
with probability 0.1/̂p ≈ 0.27675.
Firm 1’s profits in response to firm 2 playing its equilib-
rium strategy given above can be seen in Fig. 2 in which prices
range (x-axis) from p = 0.25625 to 0.45 (well beyond p̂ =
0.36134060117684275), moreover the full quantity range [0, 0.4]
(y-axis) is admitted. The equilibrium profit π = 0.0625 is the
highest value that can be seen on the vertical axis (z-axis). Ba-
sically, one can see four curves on the profit surface depicted in
Fig. 2: the one starting at price level p = 0.35, the one starting
at price level p̂ = 0.36134060117684275, the one corresponding
to the residual demand D(p) − s(p), and the one corresponding
to the demand curve 1− p. These four curves partition the profit
surface into nine regions. Starting from the x-axis, one can see
that profits are increasing in the three regions as we are getting
closer to residual demand since the firm is only bounded by its
production. Looking at the remaining two areas ending at the
highest price, one can observe that setting higher prices than
p̂ results in decreasing profits. Out of these two in the sharply
declining area the firm produces more than total demand. The
vertical plane at q = 0.4 intersects the fourth curve (associated
with D(p) = 1 − p) at price p. Profits are the highest in the
triangular area at the edge when the firm produces at its capacity
limit, in the entire neighboring small rectangular area and in the
rectangular area ‘in the middle’.
We conclude this section with a remark on the relationship
between the production in advance game and the respective
classical Cournot and Bertrand games.
Remark 1. Let the assumptions of Proposition 2 hold. Then
in the respective Bertrand game both firms set prices equal to
their common unit cost, and therefore, firms set lower prices and
achieve less profits in the Bertrand game than in the investi-
gated production-in-advance game. Furthermore, since residual
demand D(p) − k is smaller than D(p) − qc , where qc stands for
the equilibrium of the respective Cournot game, firms’ profits in
case of production-in-advance are smaller than Cournot profits.
4. Economic surplus
In this section we compare the production-in-advance game
with the production-to-order game based on their economic
(i.e. Marshallian) surpluses in equilibrium, which is given by
ES(p1, q1, p2, q2)
=
{∫ min{D(pj),q1+q2}
0 P(q)dq − c(q1 + q2) if D(pj) > qi,∫ min{D(pi),qi}
0 P(q)dq − c(q1 + q2) if D(pj) ⩽ qi,
where 0 ⩽ pi ⩽ pj ⩽ b.
Assuming linear demand D(p) = 1 − p and c = 1/6, we
illustrate firms’ profits and consumers’ surplus in Fig. 3. The
lightest gray triangle corresponds to the surplus realized by the
consumers who purchase the product at the highest price, while
the light-gray area depicts the surplus realized by the other
consumers. On the producers’ side, the low-price firm’s surplus
is given by the darkest-gray rectangle and the high-price firm’s
surplus by the dark-gray area. Note that economic surplus (i.e. the
sum of the previously described four areas) is determined by the
higher price, except when the residual demand equals zero at the
higher price.
We would like to emphasize that if sales occur at the higher
price, then the economic surplus is determined at the higher
price.
It is well-known that for small capacities in the pure-strategy
equilibrium of the production-to-order game the firms set the
market-clearing price, and thus the production-to-order and the
production-in-advance versions of the game have the same out-
come. It also means that their economic surpluses are identical.
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Fig. 3. Economic surplus.
For large capacities in the equilibrium of the production-to-
order game firms set prices equal to unit costs, while in the equi-
librium of the production-in advance game firms set prices above
unit costs with positive probability (see for instance, Montez
and Schutz, 2018). Therefore, the economic surplus is higher in
the production-to-order game than in the production-in-advance
game.
For the case of intermediate capacities (i.e. p > max {p∗, c}) it
is well-known (see for instance Vives, 1986) that there is only an
equilibrium in nondegenerated mixed strategies with cumulative
distribution function
G (p) =
(p − c) k − π
(p − c) (2k − D (p))
(30)
for any p ∈
[
p, p
]
. We will rely on (30) in the proof of our
next proposition stating that in case of intermediate capacities
economic surplus is higher in the production-to-order game than
in the production-in-advance game.
Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1–3, p > max {p∗, c} and that
a symmetric equilibrium is played, the economic surplus is higher
in the production-to-order game than in the production-in-advance
game.
Proof. First, note that the economic surplus related to the par-
tially revealed symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium by
Proposition 1 is lower than in the case when both firms play
mixed strategies F partially determined by (3) on the interval[
p, p
)
in the production-to-order game. By the latter modification
the loss in economic surplus due to both underproduction and
overproduction is eliminated.
Second, since F stochastically dominates G, the respective cu-
mulative distribution function of the higher price F 2 also stochas-
tically dominates G2. Note that sales occur always at the higher
price in case of production to order. Since the cumulative distri-
bution functions F 2 and G2 determine the economic surpluses if
sales occur at the higher price and selling just at the lower price
in case of production in advance results in less economic surplus
than for the same price pair in case of production to order, the
statement of the proposition holds true. □
Remark 2. Let the assumptions of Proposition 2 hold. Then eco-
nomic surplus is the smallest in the production-in-advance game,
second largest in the production-to-order game and the largest
in the Bertrand game. The relationship between the economic
surpluses of the Cournot game and the production-in-advance
game is far from obvious and would need a thorough additional
analysis.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have derived analytically a symmetric mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the production-in-advance game for a
large region of intermediate capacities. This is the most diffi-
cult case to solve within the capacity-constrained framework
compared with the case of small and large capacities.
In the case of small capacities the game has a simple pure-
strategy equilibrium. The case of large capacities has also, as
in the case of intermediate capacities, just a non-degenerated
mixed-strategy equilibrium. In the mixed-strategy equilibrium
of the large-capacity case firms produce at any price, with the
entire demand emerging at that price (see Montez and Schutz,
2019, Lemma IV), while in the intermediate capacity-case there
is a price region in which firms produce below their capacity
constraints, i.e., they are not producing at the boundary of their
maximum sales D(p) or production possibilities k. Probably, this is
the one of the main reasons why the intermediate-capacity case
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is more difficult to solve than the large-capacity case. The other
reason might be that the lowest possible price in the support
of the equilibrium price distribution equals unit costs in case
of large capacities, while it lies above unit costs in the case of
intermediate capacities.
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that economic surplus
will be lower in case of production in advance than in case of
production to order. This observation remains to be true also
for the case of large capacities. However, for the case of small
capacities the two games both have the same market-clearing
outcome resulting in identical economic surpluses. To summarize,
economic surplus is weekly lower in the production-in-advance
environment than in the production-to-order one.
In a future research one could try to replace the efficient
rationing of consumers imposed by Assumption 3 with another
way (e.g. random rationing) of rationing consumers by the low-
price firm. Comparing the available results for efficient rationing
with random rationing in the production-to-order framework in
case of intermediate capacities, one can expect far more complex
calculations under random rationing than the ones carried out
in the present paper. In particular, compare Levitan and Shubik
(1972) with Beckmann (1965) on the mixed-strategy equilibrium
in closed form or Vives (1986) with Allen and Hellwig (1986) on
the limiting behavior of the production-to-order game when the
number of firms tend to infinity.
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